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Article 5

Connell: Sudan: In the Eye of the African Storm

Dan Connell

SUDAN: IN THE EYE OF
THE AFRICAN STORM

HROUGH BINOCULARS I can see clouds of reddish-brown dust billowing
behind a Toyota pick-up racing across the burnt savannah-a Dashka
.50-caliber machine gun is mounted on its back. Crouched around me
are a dozen guerrillas armed with AK-47s, hand grenades and light machine
guns. The mood is casual, but no one wants to give the enemy an easy target,
so we stay low. It is a familiar scene, one I experienced dozens of times in the
1970s and 1980s after clandestinely crossing the border from Sudan to cover
Eritrea's war for independence from Ethiopia. The difference now, in 1997, is
that the guns point toward Khartoum and the fighters are not Eritrean.
The guerrillas are members ofthe Sudan Alliance Forces (SAP), one of
several Sudanese groups with operational bases and training camps in western
Eritrea. Their aim is to overthrow the government ofthe National Islamic Front
(NIF), which came to power in Khartoum after a military coup in 1989. SAP
leaders claim their forces killed or wounded dozens of government soldiers in
cross-border raids in 1996. For its part, the Sudanese government last year
announced death sentences for several high-ranking members of the armed
forces in Port Sudan on charges ofplotting a coup with the support ofEritrea.
In January of this year, the fighting escalated sharply when the SAP and other
anti-government forces launched coordinated attacks into Sudan along a 500mile front from bases in Eritrea and Ethiopia, as opposition forces in the South
also stepped up fighting. With the NIF regime confronting a threat to its very
survival, the government declared a national emergency and issued a call for a
full-scale mobilization.
This escalating confrontation-already enmeshed in a web ofinterlocking conflicts that stretches from Central Mrica to the Middle East-has the
potential at any moment to spark a larger regional war. As such, it is fast
attracting the attention of outside powers whose growing involvement raises
the stakes further. Sudanese opposition leaders claim that Khartoum is supporting Islamist forces in Egypt, Algeria, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, Kenya,
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Uganda, and as far west as the Gambia, Niger, and Senegal, as well as from
Palestine, Lebanon, and elsewhere in the Middle East. The NIF also supports
Christian "fundamentalists" in northern Uganda in reprisal for that country's
aid to southern Sudanese opposition forces, and it is reportedly helping Hutu
militias based in eastern Zaire for similar reasons.
The backing ofIran, Iraq, and an array ofwealthy Islamists from Saudi
Arabia, Qatar, and other Gulf states enables Khartoum to pursue these
objectives, even as the country's civilian economy teeters on the brink of
collapse. This has in turn galvanized Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Uganda into an
alliance to support efforts by Sudanese opposition groups to topple the regime.
In late 1996, the U.S. announced it would channel what it termed "non-lethal
military aid" to these three front-line states. Meanwhile, France, increasingly
concerned at its loss of influence in the region, has maneuvered to gain
advantage by quietly assisting the NIF. For its part, Egypt has sought to steer
an independent course, fearing any outcome that further erodes its traditional
influence in Sudan and jeopardizes its access to the Nile waters.
The crisis radiates out in concentric circles from the war in southern
Sudan. Like all the former colonies along the southern edge of the Sahara,
Sudan is ethnically divided between an Arab, mostly Muslim, North and an
African South, populated mainly by Christians and practitioners of traditional
religions. These fault lines lend themselves to but are not the cause of the
conflict. The latest fighting in Sudan began in the early 1980s, after the
northern-dominated government violated a 1972 regional autonomy agreement that had ended the first civil war (which began immediately after the
country became independent in 1956). Khartoum reneged on the pact after
confirming oil discoveries in the south. fighting resumed in 1983, when the
military regime of Gen. Ja'afar al-Nimeiri decreed that henceforth the entire
country would be governed under Islamic shari'a law. Though Nimeiri was
overthrown in 1985 and a democratically-elected, civilian government was
installed the following year, little changed. Under President Sadiq Al-Mahdi,
the government initiated a dialogue with the SPLA and pledged to reconsider
the imposition ofshari'a law, but days before the negotiations were set to begin,
Al-Mahdi was overthrown and the "peace process" was aborted.
The renewed civil war took a heavy toll on an already battered economy
and wreaked havoc on the civilian population. Hundreds of thousands in the
south were made homeless and famine became endemic. However, few people
sought refuge outside Sudan's borders and access to the warfront for journalists
was both difficult and dangerous. As a result of this isolation-and because no
major powers were directly involved-the conflict remained largely hidden
from public view. Despite ever-escalating military offensives, neither side
appeared able to alter the balance offorces enough to gain a decisive advantage
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over the other. All that changed after 1989, when the NIF seized power in
Khartoum.
The new government first found support from Iran and then from
Islamist patrons in other Gulfstates. This enabled the NIF to make massive arms
purchases from China and the former Soviet republics, which have become
major suppliers of arms to anyone who can pay for them. Popular Defense
Forces, modeled after Iran's Republican Guards, were mobilized to the
warfront alongside regular forces. After backing Iraq in the GulfWar, the NIF
also received stepped up military aid from Baghdad in the form of technical
assistance and training, despite the continuing enmity between Iran and Iraq.
Meanwhile, the fall of the Soviet-backed Mengistu government in
neighboring Ethiopia cost the SPLA its main rear base. In the early 1990s,
Khartoum finally appeared poised for a military victory, but the NIF's support
for Islamist groups operating in neighboring countries quickly put it on a
collision course with these governments and once again changed the equation.
Uganda now offered alternative access to the SPLA, and the new governments
in Eritrea and Ethiopia upped the ante by supporting the SAP and other
opposition groups.
In 1991, soon after Eritrea won its war for independence from
Ethiopia, a Sudan-backed group called Eritrean Islamic Jihad (ElJ) began to
launch raids from Sudan into the western part of Eritrea. Initially Eritrean
officials termed it a minor irritant and did little to confront it directly. They
refused to publicize the occasional incidents-ambushes, land mines and
assassinations-carried out by EIJ, doing little to mobilize a military presence
in the area. This changed at the end of 1994, after a raid in which Sudanesebacked Islamist militants, reportedly from several countries besides Eritrea,
were captured or killed by Eritrean forces. Eritrea quickly broke relations with
Sudan and announced its intention to support the opposition.
In 1995 and 1996, the Eritrean government, led by President Isaias
AfWerki, hosted a series of high profile conferences in the Asmara capital that
were attended by nearly all the Sudanese opposition groups. The broad
coalition which emerged-the National Democratic Alliance (NDA)-adopted
a program that, among other things, called for the formation of a unitary,
secular state in Sudan. It also recognized the right of the peoples of southern
Sudan to self-determination. (The precise way in which this right would be
exercised was not spelled out.) The main constituents ofthe NDA were the two
largest traditional parties of northern Sudan, the Umma Party and the Democratic Unionist Party (between periods of military rule, both of these parties
have dominated Sudanese politics since independence), and the SPLA, led by
Dr. John Garang, which has been waging war against the government in the
southern third of the country since the early 1980s.
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Several smaller opposition parties also joined, including the declining Sudan
Communist Party, one of the oldest communist parties on the continent, and
the Sudan Alliance Forces, a new player on the political scene.
By early 1996, the Ethiopians were again providing sanctuary, as well
as training and heavy arms, for the SPLA. The scales were tipped for Ethiopia
after Khartoum's alleged involvement in the June 1995 assassination attempt
on Egyptian president Hosni Mubaraq in Addis Ababa. The underlying
motivation, however, was Khartoum's support for Islamist groups operating in
southern Ethiopia and Somalia.
The SAF, launched in August 1995, appears to be the main armed
threat to the Sudanese regime on the northern front; it also offers a direct
political challenge to the traditional clan-based parties. The Beja Congress, an
organization founded in the 1950s to represent an Islamic minority group that
straddles the border between Eritrea and Sudan, also has armed units in the area,
as does the SPLA under the name of the New Sudan Brigade. All three groups
are engaged in cross-border combat along Sudan's eastern frontier.
The military strategy of the SAF and the other armed groups clustered
in the NDA is to force the government into spreading its reserves in an
increasingly elongated defense perimeter that weakens the center ofthe country
to the point where a civilian uprising or a military coup, or some combination
of the two, become viable. These allied opposition forces were in early 1997
prepositioning themselves for attempts to take control ofthe Roseires Dam and
to cut the road and rail links from Port Sudan to the capital as a second phase
in this strangulation campaign. For the time being, however, they were avoiding
the capture of installations or large population centers that would force them
into a defensive posture.
Meanwhile, an SPLA campaign in the south that got underway in midMarch near the Uganda border was targeted first at laying siege to, or even
capturing, the critical city of Juba and then at connecting with SPLA forces in
the Nuba Mountains. Opposition cadre of the Sudan Federal Democratic
Alliance, another group now training military forces in western Eritrea, was also
secretly organizing supporters in Darfur with the goal of opening a third front
on Sudan's western border.
By March 1997, SAF leaders were giving the NIF regime a maximum
life-span of6-12 months before it collapsed. However, the growth of the SAF
worries other opposition leaders, particularly those parties without significant
military forces under their command, who see the emergence ofa multi-ethnic
armed force as a direct threat to their claim to represent the only viable
alternative to the Islamist regime. From their standpoint, the longer the war
continues and the more territory-and population-the SAF gains control
over, the weaker the old political parties will be in a postwar transition. For this
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reason, leaders ofthe U mma party ofdeposed president Sadiq al- Mahdi and the
Democratic Unionist Party of Mohammed Osman Mirghani, who also chairs
the NDA, are engaged in a flurry of diplomatic forays aimed at starting peace
talks as soon as possible.
At the March NDA 1997 summit convened to begin discussions on a
postwar transition program, Sadiq al-Mahdi tabled a proposal to return to the
parliamentary system in place prior to the 1989 coup in a power-sharing
agreement among the opposition groups that would leave the U mma party with
the largest share, followed by the DUP. Despite the absence of both Dr. John
Garang and the SAP's Abdel Aziz Khaled, this proposal was shelved until the
next NDA meeting. However, the incident highlighted the fragility of the
opposition alliance. Whether or not they are able to reach an agreement on
specific postwar commitments, coupled with the question of where the SPLA
situates itselfin the debate, will determine the political viability ofthe coalition.
The issue brings to the fore the simmering tensions between the traditional
parties that have long-dominated Sudanese politics and the "New Sudan"
forces of the SAP, the nascent SFDA, the Beja Congress, the Sudan National
Party (from the N uba Mountains), and, perhaps, the SPLAjSPLM, which has
now to determine whether it wishes to remain identified principally as a regional
military power or to transform itself into a national political party.
The SAP's multi-ethnic composition and its progressive political
program distinguish it from the other parties in the Sudanese opposition. In one
platoon based on the border, there were fighters from Equatoria, Kordofan,
Darfur, Nyala, Kassala, Medani, and Khartoum. While most are defectors from
the Sudanese army, the SAP also draws intellectuals, former communists, trade
unionists and other civilians who are thoroughly disenchanted with both the
NIF regime and the narrowly-based traditional parties. The SAP, like other leftoriented national liberation groups, has mass organizations ofwomen, workers,
and students. It trains its fighters in politics and history, as well as military
strategy and tactics. "By the end ofthe day, you have not only a fighter, you have
a politician," says SAP leader Abdel Aziz Khaled. "The problem of the Sudan
is not the NIF," says the former Sudanese brigadier general. "It is the mentality
of those who ruled this country from 1956 up to now. The NIF came out of
the pockets of the traditional parties. We are not just fighting to defeat the
regime, since we know it will go, we are building a new movement to have a
modern state."
All this makes Egypt extremely anxious. Though the NIF has been
closely identified with support for the Islamic Group, which has claimed
responsibility for dozens of guerrilla attacks in Egypt and is believed widely to
be behind the attempt on Mubaraq's life in Addis Ababa, Cairo has been slow
to jump on the bandwagon to overthrow the Khartoum government. This is
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because it cannot live with any of the potential outcomes of the NIF's demise,
apart from the unlikely return to power of the traditional ruling families. other
possibilities include the split ofSudan into two countries, North and South, or
a descent into Somali-style chaos, with Islamists and various ethnic warlords
carving out spheres of control. Finally, the NIF could be overthrown by a
revolutionary regime that reorients the country away from Egypt and toward
its African neighbors. All three scenarios involve an unacceptable loss of
Egyptian influence, but Cairo's biggest worry is the potential loss ofcontrol of
the Egypt's lifeblood-the headwaters ofthe Nile. Talk in Ethiopia ofdamming
the Blue Nile has only exacerbated these fears, even as the Egyptians are
considering a diversion ofNile waters into the northwestern desert to bring new
areas under cultivation there. Under these circumstances, Cairo has been
clinging to the possibility that it can either negotiate an agreement with the NIF
that will remove Egypt as an Islamist target or that it can contain the Islamists
within Egypt with no further damage. However, the high profile role that
deposed Sudanese president Sadiq al-Mahdi has played in the opposition since
escaping house arrest in Khartoum at the end of 1996, coupled with the
changing military situation and a visit from Eritrean president Isaias Afwerki in
early 1997, appears to be causing the Mubaraq government to re-evaluate this
position.
Among Western countries, France is closest to Khartoum. In exchange
for the 1994 extradition of"Carlos the Jackal," France is widely though to have
provided Sudan with intelligence on SPLA positions. Sudanese opposition
figures also claim France has provided various forms ofteclmical assistance and
military or police-related training to the NIF, and that it has brokered
arrangements between Sudan and Zaire and Sudan and the Central African
Republic to allow Sudanese forces to use their territories to launch surprise
attacks against the SPLA. France, like Egypt, appears to be motivated in part by
a hope that it can persuade the NIF to rein in Islamists threatening their interests
in Algeria, ifnot within France itself. The French, however, are also worried by
their loss ofinfluence in the region, notably in Rwanda and potentially in Zaire.
The Sudan is seen as a buffer against widening US influence in North Africa.
Whatever its direct involvement with the NIF, France has rebuffed Sudanese
opposition leaders, who claim they have been denied an audience to make their
case in Paris.
Only time will tell how real is the developing challenge to the NIF.
Much hinges on the viability of the Sudanese opposition-the first serious
challenge to the rise ofIslamist movements to emerge in this region since the
Cold War. There are, however, a host of other questions on the table. Can a
small core of former army officers and intellectuals-in the SAP or other new
opposition groups-navigate their way through this political minefield to craft
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an independent, progressive, secular Sudanese national movement? Can these
new forces move to the forefront and take control of the NDA from the
traditional political parties, which enjoy the backing from US and other outside
forces? What level and kind of influence will the US have within this alliance?
How will Iran react to a threat to its ally, the NIF? What will the Iraqis do in
this odd political mix? Which way will Egypt move AS the conflict escalates?
Finally, should the opposition succeed in ousting the NIF, would a stable, postwar Sudan be a building block in a powerful new regional alliance with Eritrea,
Ethiopia, Uganda, Rwanda and others that redraws the balance of power
throughout the region?
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